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INTRODUCTION

By now, the dramatic stories of Chile's loss of democratic government as well as the events leading to a transition government
* B.A. 1966, J.D. 1969, University of Oklahoma; LL.M. 1970, Harvard University. A.
Allen King Scholar and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American
University. This Article relies on research commenced while the author was Co-Director of
the Washington College of Law's Law Program in Chile in June and July, 1990. The
research is supported by The American University Law School Alumni Association Fund,
whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
Far too many Chilean professors, lawyers, and government officials contributed to the
author's attempts to understand the transition in Chile fairly to be named. However, the
author thanks Professors Eduardo Soto Kloss, Director of the Department of Public Law at
the University of Chile, who made this research less daunting, and Arturo Aylwin, the
Comptroller General of the Republic of Chile, whose cooperation and that of his staff
provided many and useful insights. Thanks also go to the author's colleagues, Claudio
Grossman and Richard Wilson, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
Of course, none of the persons who have helped is responsible for any of the author's errors,
nor -does their assistance necessarily suggest agreement with the author's conclusions.
Thanks also to Juan Milanbs for his assistance in Chile and for his translation of a number
of Spanish materials.
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headed by Patricio Aylwin have been told.1 On September 11,
1973, military forces ousted the elected government of Salvador Allende, ending one of the oldest democracies in South America. The
brutal repression that followed stirred protest throughout the
world.2 The events leading to the transition are complex, 3 but
throughout this period of repression, human rights advocates in
Chile preserved a record of the abuses, exposed the activities of the
military government, and sought to hold the government accountable under the law.' Partly as a result of the openings for political
action created by these advocates, the people of Chile have undertaken a period of transition between the military regime and
democracy.
Chile was one of the countries whose experience formed the
basis for political and social analyses of the breakdown of Latin
American democratic regimes in the 1970s.5 More recent events
have made Chile an appropriate case for examining transitions
from authoritarian to democratic governments. These findings being, perhaps, applicable to other transitions in South America and
Eastern Europe.
This Article examines one aspect of the transition and considers how public employment law in Chile relates to the transition to
democracy. In so doing, the Article describes the character and
1. E.g.,

SAMUEL CHAVKIN, STORM OVER CHILE: THE JUNTA UNDER SIEGE

(1985) (describ-

ing the coup and repression following); Carlos Huneeus, From Diarchy to Democracy: Prospects for Democracy in Chile in Transition and Consolidation, in MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE
AND THE SOUTHERN CONE (Enrique A. i3aloyra ed., 1987) (suggesting conditions permit use of
noncompetitive elections to move to democratic rule); NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS,

CHILE'S TRANSITION

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY]

TO DEMOCRACY

(1988) [hereinafter

CHILE'S

(describing the 1988 Presidential Plebiscite).

2. A number of official and nongovernmental organizations criticized the human rights
record of the military government. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situ-

ation of Human Rights in Chile, U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. A/34/583
(1979);

(1983);

ORGANIZATION OF

AMERICAN STATES, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE

(1985) [hereinafter

OAS

AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL,

CHILE: EVIDENCE OF TORTURE

REPORT]; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES OF THE MILITARY

JUNTA IN CHILE, THE CRIMES OF THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA IN THE LIGHT OF CHILEAN LAW
(1974) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY].

3. See Huneeus, supra note 1; Manuel Antonio Garreton, The PoliticalEvolution of

the Chilean Military Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY (Guillermo A. O'Donnell et al.
eds., 1986).
4. A description of these activities may be found in Hugo Fruhling, Repressive Policies
and Legal Dissent in Authoritarian Regimes: Chile 1973-1981, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 351
(1984).
5. See generally JUAN J. LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, AND REEQUILIBRATION (1978).
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regulation of public employment prior to the 1973 coup, during the
military regime, and during the period of transition. This examination is comparative in three ways. First, the experience in public
employment in Chile can be evaluated under two models of public
employment, both of which address part of the reality of the Chilean experience. In some respects, the transition in Chile can be
analogized to the change of administrations in a liberal democratic
state. In other respects, the transition can be analogized to the creation of a multiparty democracy from a one-party state. Therefore,
evaluation and application of the Chilean experience rests on different views of public employment.
Second, the examination of Chile's public employment law in
the transition to democracy provides one case study against which
the experiences of other countries in transition can be compared.
In this second sense, the Article recognizes the importance of the
specific context in which the Chilean transition is occurring while
still conceding its relevance to transitions occurring in significantly
different circumstances. The Article suggests why public employment law offers a useful focus for examining how perceptions of
law can influence events during a transition and presents some interesting implications for legal debates in the United States.
Third, a crucial institution in the regulation of public employment in Chile, La ContraloriaGeneral de la Repablica, was patterned after a specific institution, the Comptroller General of the
United States. During six decades, the two institutions have diverged, and their divergence offers opportunity for recognizing the
influence of legal culture on the development of institutions.
Examination of the Chilean experience reminds us of the importance of the public service in any transition and cautions us
that different perspectives of the character of public employment
can influence the lessons to be drawn. These interpretations of the
Chilean experience rest upon some understanding of the rules governing the transition in Chile, how the legal regulation of public
employment has evolved from the 1960s through the transition,
and how that regulation reflects more generally held views regarding the nature of law and the legal system.

II.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

The transition to democracy in Chile occurs against a legal
and political framework different from that which has marked the

392

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

transition in many other countries. Unlike transitions where the
previous government has disintegrated or capitulated, the legal
and political framework in Chile reflects the continuing power of
both the military and the conservative elements of Chilean society.
Because the transition government acquired office through procedures established after the coup, the rules of transition have been
principally established by the military government. In addition,
the present government operates, with some recent changes, 7 under
the Constitution of 19808 submitted by the military government
and approved in a plebiscite.' The rules of transition guarantee a
continuing role for the military and assure conservatives of influence in the government well beyond their electoral power. These
rules of the 1980 Constitution and their reform in 1989 include
separate powers and prerogatives for the military, i ° appointed senators," multimember districts that increase the role of political minorities,1 2 independence of the central bank,1 3 a special constitutional court, 1 ' preservation of a Supreme Court, most of the
6. After the democratic coalition won the 1988 Presidential Plebiscite, some modifications were made in the terms of the transition. These changes may have reflected direct
negotiations as well as the altered political environment. Evidence of some of the modifications are the changes made in the 1989 reform of the Constitution.
7. The 1989 reform of the Constitution, although not changing the basic rules of the
transition, did reduce the power of the military in the transition government. For example,
the reform modified the role of the National Security Council, controlled by the military, as
well as the prohibitions against the political participation of certain groups. See generally
Law No. 18.825, Modifica la Constituci6n Politica de la Rep blica de Chile, 33.450 DAIRIO
OFICIAL,

Aug. 17, 1989, at 5,405.

8. CONSTITuci6N POLTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE DE 1980 [hereinafter CHILE CONST.
or 1980 Constitution, interchangeably].
9. Considerable doubt exists regarding the fairness of the plebiscite adopting the 1980
Constitution. E.g., AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PLEBISCITE (1988) (detailing intimidation, fraud, and limitations on the opposition).
10. Article 95 of the 1980 Constitution creates a National Security Council with powers
to comment on threats to national security (art. 96), as well as powers to appoint members
to the Constitutional Tribunal (art. 81) and certain members to the Senate. See supra note
7 (the 1989 constitutional revision reduced the near veto powers of the National Security
Council).
11. In addition to the elected senators and former presidents (who after the presidency
serve in the Senate for life), there are at least nine nonelected members of the Senate. Two
senators are former justices of the Supreme Court, elected by the present Supreme Court;
one senator is to be a former comptroller general elected by the Supreme Court. The group
also includes a former commander of each service: the army, navy, airforce, and carabineros,
elected by the National Security Council; a former university rector and a former minister
of state are appointed to the Senate by the President. See CHILE CONST. art. 45.
12. Two senators are elected from each electoral district. CHILE CONST. art 45.
13. The national central bank is made an "autonomous body." CHILE CONST. arts. 9798.
14. The Constitutional Tribunal can determine the constitutionality of all organic con-
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members of which were appointed by the military regime, and a
tenured public service."
A.

The Civil Law Tradition and the Role of Law

Unlike in the United States and some countries of Western
Europe, no generation of legal realists in Chile has challenged the
formalism of Chilean law. Chilean law rests heavily on the civil law
traditions of Europe and the French Civil Code."6 This tradition
was passed to Chile through the Spanish"7 and in many areas the
Spanish did not incorporate the reforms of the Code adopted elsewhere in Europe. In Chile, law consists of a set of norms that can
be formally, almost mechanically, applied.'8 This tradition separates law from politics, from philosophy, and from ethics. In it law
is evaluated almost solely by its content rather than its effects.
Emphasis on the importance of formal norms and on the formal
application of these norms creates legal actors, particularly judges,
who see their law-making function as extremely limited. The often
repeated phrase, "a judge is only a slave of the law," captures the
spirit of this limitation." This formalistic view of the law and its
acceptance of the state as the sole source of law has generally precluded any role for natural law.20 Moreover, the importance of the
civil code, its permanence and influence, has reduced the importance of the Constitution, which has been more often changed and
is more likely to be viewed as a document engineering the strucstitutional laws prior to promulgation; resolve questions about the constitutionality of laws,
treaties, and other provisions; determine the constitutionality of plebiscites; and declare certain organizations, political movements, or political parties unconstitutional. CHILE CONST.
art. 82. The Constitutional Tribunal consists of seven members: three Supreme Court justices elected by the Court by an absolute majority, one attorney designated by the President, two attorneys elected by the National Security Council, and one attorney elected by
an absolute majority of the Senate. Id. art. 81.
15. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 26-40.
16. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID SCOTT CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW:
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 158-69, 208-16 (1976).
17. Id. at 208-16.
18. Id.
19. The author heard this phrase repeated often by law professors, attorneys, and
judges.
20. At least in an environment of polarization, the Supreme Court appeared to abandon
a purely formalistic role. Near the end of the Allende government, the Supreme Court-denounced the government and alluded to the right of rebellion granted to the citizens of a
government. The Supreme Court's criticism of the Allende government is discussed in INFORME DE LA COMISI6N DE VERDAD Y RECONCILIACI6N, INFORME RETTIG 96 (1991) [hereinafter
INFORME].
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ture of government.
Chile shares the civil law perspective of courts as bureaucracy.21 A judicial career separates the judge from other legal actors and places the judge in a bureaucracy where appointment, assignment, pay, and promotion are controlled or highly influenced
by judges above in the judicial hierarchy. Indeed, the Chilean Supreme Court exercises personnel functions over lower courts and
plays a significant, if not predominant, part in the selection of
members of the Supreme Court.2 2
Not surprisingly, Chilean courts and judges provided little restraint on the military government installed after the coup. The
courts acquiesced in the creation of courts and tribunals operating
outside of the normal judicial system. During the years of the military regime, human rights advocates brought to the courts hundreds of petitions for habeas corpus seeking the release of persons
held by the military or subjected to torture during imprisonment.2 3
Fewer than a handful of these petitions were granted and the
courts routinely accepted, at face value, seemingly incredible official explanations.2 4 Moreover, the few judges who did act found
themselves subject to discipline by the Supreme Court. 25 The
. Court admonished these judges because they were not acting as
judges should-they were attempting to make rather than follow
the law, and seeking to implement political or moral views beyond
their purview. The traditions of the civil law system and the judicial structure in which they operated gave judges little theoretical
or practical basis for resistance.
Also influenced by legal formalism, other institutions.took the
same limited view of their functions. Public employment law, less
21. For example, in Chile, the Supreme Court administers all of the courts except the
Constitutional Tribunal and the military courts. The Supreme Court has the power to discipline judges of lower courts. See CHILE CONST. art. 79.
22. A vacancy on the Supreme Court is filled by the President from a list of five names
submitted by the Supreme Court. CHILE CONST. art. 75.
23. See generally THE VICARIA OF SOLIDARITY, EXTENT OF WORK IN OVERALL FIGURES
(1990) (describing the use of petitions for habeas corpus)(copy of the report in the author's
files); Fruhling, supra note 4, at 359, 363-66; INFORME, supra note 20.
24. Fruhling, supra note 4, at 364, 370 (describing the negative response of the courts).
"The courts acted as if government officials were always telling the truth, particularly when
they denied having detained somebody ....
" Id. at 364.
25. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's sanctioning Judge Ren6 Garcia Villegas. Juez Rent Garcia Villegas: Se Me Acusa de Violar Provisibn a Jueces de Actuar en
Politica, EL MERCURIO, Sept. 14, 1988, at 5D; and the sanctioning of Judge Carlos Cerda.
JOAQUIN GARCIA-HUIDOBRO CORREA, A PRoP6SITO DE UNA SANCI6N (1987).

1991-92]

DEMOCRACY IN CHILE

dramatically, but just as importantly as human rights provisions,
failed to provide an effective rebuke to the military government.
Ironically, from one perspective, this lack of effective response
resting on a formalistic view of the role of the law preserved the
institutions which now play a role in the regulation of public employment during the transition.
B. The Regulation of Public Employment Law in Chile
1960-1990
This [failure to work more or produce more] is the same lazy
bureaucratic path taken by prior regimes ....

I do not know of

one Head of Service that has requested a quarter or half an hour
extra pay per day from his/her employees. In contrast, I tell you
that I do know that no public office in Chile works on Saturday
mornings and sometimes, not even the regular office hours: they
wait for quitting time and a quarter hour beforehand they take
off and when they have to work on the day prior to a long weekend, well, that afternoon, my friends only lasts a half hour to an
26
hour.

This 1971 statement by President Salvador Allende could easily reflect the sentiments of elected officials in many democratic
governments. Indeed, Allende and previous Chilean leaders presided over a public service similar to and sharing the perception
and values of those in other multiparty states. Chilean public employment law, as reflected in the Administrative Statute of that
time,27 was highly structured; the technical and professional skills
26. GUSTAVO SANTISO GALVEZ, LA BUROCRACIA 86, 88 (1973) (reporting meeting between
Dr. Allende and the heads of public services at "La Moneda," the Presidential Palace, on
September 30, 1971).
27. In substance, the 1960 Administrative Statute, Decree Law No. 338 Estatuto Administrativo 24,613 DIARIO OFICIAL, Apr. 6, 1960, at 863 [hereinafter DFL 338], and the 1990
Administrative Statute, Law No. 18.834, are basically the same. See Law No. 18.834, La
Junta de Gobierno de la Repzblica de Chile ha dado su aprobaci6n al sigiuente, 33.479
DIARIO OFIcIAL, Sept. 23, 1989, at 6425 [hereinafter 1990 Administrative Statute]. The principal difference is the condensing of the 1960 Administrative Statute from 392 articles to
157 articles in the 1990 Administrative Statute. The few substantive differences between the
two statutes illustrate their basic similarity. Some of these differences include: a limitation
in the number of public employees who can serve on one-year contracts included in the
1990, but not the 1960 statute. Id. art. 9. The 1990 statute contains none of the exemptions
for foreigners with scientific knowledge serving in the civil service, whereas exemptions in
the 1960 statute permitted service by these foreigners. DFL 338, supra art. 9. The 1990
statute alters somewhat the performance appraisal system contained in the 1960 statute.
See 1990 Administrative Statute, supra arts. 31-39. The 1990 statute increases the work
week but does not require work on Saturday, as did the 1960 statute; the 1990 statute also
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of public employees controlled appointment and tenure.2 8
The 1960 Administrative Statute contained a number of legal
protections for public employees and gave most of these employees
a property right in their positions.2 9 Provisions for pay, promotion,
and discipline provided criteria for employee evaluation and limited the discretion of administrative officials in personnel actions.30
This approach not only recognized the rights of public employees
but also reflected a concern that partisan political groups in a multiparty state be restrained in the exercise of the power of the bureaucracy. The approach also fit easily with the perception of formal legal rules structuring relationships in society.
As in many democratic governments, public employees were
perceived as nonpolitical public operatives who carried out the orders of their superiors according to technical criteria. The 1960 Administrative Statute protected Chilean public employees from political coercion, prohibited the use of official positions for political
purposes, and limited the type of political activities in which these
employees could engage."1
Executives in democratic governments have long complained
that this protection of public employees and the perception of the
bureaucracy as nonpolitical implementers of policy in fact created
institutions that were not responsive to control by democratically
makes provision for compensatory time for employees required to work longer than the designated 44-hour work week. Compare DFL 338, supra art. 143 with 1990 Administrative
Statute, supra art. 59.
28. DFL 338, supra note 27, art. 39 (skills control employment and tenure).
29. Id. art. 37 (employees have right to continued employment). One observer of the
Chilean bureaucracy doubted the impartiality of the bureaucracy or its selection based on
merit.
The social implications of the importance of kinship and political contacts for
promotion is the perpetuation of existing groups and confinement of access to
higher posts to select groups. In more general terms, the influence of political
criteria and family ties tends to undermine the possibility of selecting personnel
on the basis of merit, and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to build a competent, professional civil service capable of acting impartially on the basis of objective needs and criteria.
JAMES F. PETRAS, POLITICS AND SOCIAL FORCES IN CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT 308 (1969). A simi-

lar assessment of the civil service in Brazil can be found in LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM, CIVIL
SERVICE REFORM IN BRAZIL: PRINCIPLES VERSUS PRACTICE 125-39, 177-78 (1968) (reform
failed to consider the greater role of the family in Brazilian life, the aristocratic heritage of
the Brazilian civil service, and the need for patronage by political parties as a unifying
device).
30. DFL 338, supra note 27, arts. 40-52.
31. DFL 338, supra note 27, art. 99 (employees may not use authority of position to
favor or prejudice any political party or teaching). See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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elected officials. In the United States, this executive concern has
been accommodated by increasing the number of "political appointees" over whom executive officials have discretion outside of the
normal restraints of personnel authority.3 In contrast, the Chilean
public service, like many other western civil services, provided for
very few political appointments. 3 At the time, only the first two
levels of officials within a ministry could be appointed by the President or by politically appointed officials. For many ministries, this
the number of political appointees to two or
restriction limited
3 4
three individuals.

Structurally, the protections provided to public employees and
the restraints imposed on administrative officials were supervised
by the Contraloria General de la Repablica. This office traced its
antecedents to Spanish Colonial administration 35 but eventually
came to adopt the Comptroller General in the United States and in
Great Britain as its model. 3 e Like the Comptroller General, the
ContraloriaGeneral audited governmental expenditures and provided opinions on the legality of the expenditures of public
funds.3 ' The Contraloria General, however, had greater authority
to review the constitutionality and legality of a variety of administrative acts and the responsibility to review all personnel actions
32. For a history of the growth of such appointments in the federal government, see
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW ch. 1 (1976).
33. One observer focused on the flexibility that an administration had in maneuvering
within these confines.
Almost all middle and upper administrative posts are spoils of the new government. Though protected from summary dismissal and salary cuts, the displaced
administrators from the previous regime are delegated minor tasks in which they
lose almost all influence. Their experience is not tapped; they are in a position
neither to initiate policy nor sabotage it, if such were their intention.
PETER S. CLEAVES, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN CHILE 1 (1974). Such a
strategy requires continual and perhaps substantial growth in the civil service.
34. Partly in response to the rigidities of the civil service, Chilean administrations relied on "independent" agencies or government corporations to carry out several important
development projects in housing and in transportation. These agencies and corporations did
not have to send regulatory decrees to the Comptroller General for approval and they could
establish salaries higher than those provided in the civil service. The Allende government
used nongovernmental groups more extensively than its predecessors. CLEAVES, supra note
33, at 1 n.1, 10-12. In 1970, Chile had 80 publicly owned companies. By 1973, there were 480
and by 1979, after a program of privatization by the military government, there were 32.
JORGE MARSHALL & PILAR ROMAGUERA, LA EVOLUCI6N DE EMPLEO POBLICO EN CHILE 1970ROBERT G.

1978, at 3 (1981).
35. See generally SONIA PINTO ET AL., ANTECEDENTES HIST6RICOS DE LA CONTRALORIA
GENERAL DE LA REPOBLICA 1541-1927 (1977).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 94-109.
37. CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 21 (added by Law No. 7727 of Nov. 23, 1943).
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including disciplinary actions taken by other government ministries against public employees.3 8 Indeed, personnel actions approved by individual agencies could not have been taken until reviewed by the Contraloria General. Much of this review was pro
forma since it was accomplished on the basis of documents prepared by the agency with a concern about the compliance of the
action with the specific requirements of the Administrative Statute. Still, the ContraloriaGeneral provided the mechanism for review and a body of opinion applying the provisions of the Administrative Statute. 9
This administrative scheme reflected the more general legal
climate in which formal rules provided the principal, often the
only, basis for decision and in which review emphasized written
forms and procedures. Such a system permitted the acceptance of
technical formality for compliance and encouraged a narrow view
of legality.
38. Id.; FREDERICO G. GIL, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE 98 (Dayton McKean ed.,
1966) (discussing history of the authority to review the legality of administrative decrees).
39. The disciplinary provisions provide an excellent example of the Contralora General's review of personnel actions. When the governmental agency begins an investigation of
an employee on allegations that could lead to disciplinary action, the agency must notify the
Contraloria General. The agency's investigation is inquisitorial with the appointed official
taking testimony and compiling documents relevant to the charge. During the investigation,
the employee has a right to have representation. If appropriate, the investigation may
culminate in a notice of charges against the employee; these charges must be specific and
properly alleged. If not, the Contraloria General will return the charges to the agency for
correction. An agency prosecutor chosen by the agency conducts this investigation. The
prosecutor must be of the same or higher rank than the employee investigated; the prosecutor is assisted by a secretary who takes statements and other materials for the record. The
prosecutor writes a report or an analysis including a proposed sanction. The charged employee receives a notice of the report and access to it. The report is forwarded to the deputy
chief of the agency who reviews the report and has the authority to lower or to increase the
sanction.
The decisions of the ContraloriaGeneral set out procedures to be followed. If the Contraloria General finds that an error in procedure has been committed, the action is returned
to the agency which must commence action anew from the point where the error was made.
The ContraloraGeneral requires that the error be an essential one that appears to have
affected the outcome. This harmful error rule would not require return of an action for
minor procedural errors, such as filing a report after the deadline. See generally Eduardo
Soto Kloss, El ProcedirnientoDisciplinarioen el Estatuto Administrativo, 17 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PBLICO 111 (1975) (Chile).
As the statutes and the decisions of the ContraloriaGeneral indicate, the disciplinary
provisions and the procedures for review have not changed significantly since the 1960s.
This continuity of procedure and rule is discussed in more detail in the text infra at notes
79-81.
This process reflects the general character of Chilean adjudication that is judge-centered and that relies heavily on documentary material.
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The military government benefitted from this legal tradition
as well as from the structure of public employment law. The military regime retained the legality of public employment and the legitimacy of existing institutions while at the same time significantly altering the character of public employment and the nature
of protections available to civil servants. By decree, the military
government provided that the confidence of the President of Chile
was required of all persons holding positions in the public service,
with the exception of the judiciary and of the ContraloriaGeneral,
thus rendering most public employees temporary ones.40 Through
this decree, the government removed the protections applicable to
public employees and permitted the President to dismiss employees. The military government could thus remove employees without violating legal requirements since they did not provide protections to employees serving at the pleasure of the President.
The military government used this authority to remove a
number of public employees. It appears that many of the removals
were based on political tests that targeted employees with leftist
persuasions. As the removals proceeded, they also served as a way
of reducing the public sector, a goal of the Chicago trained economists who were placed in charge of the government's economic policy. It is difficult to determine precisely how many employees were
removed under this authority, but from the time of the coup
through 1978, the military government reduced public employment
by approximately 94,000 positions. 1 Probably not all the positions
of dismissed employees were removed from the public sector because the removal of public employees was also used to open positions for supporters of the coup and persons deemed ideologically
acceptable. Therefore, the number of persons affected by the decree may have exceeded the reduction of public service positions
during this period.
The military government also altered the structure of government ministries and used its power to place military personnel in
influential positions. For example, from 1972 to April 1986 about
half of the ministers had been members of the armed forces.4 2
40. OAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
41. MARSHALL & ROMAGUERA, supra note 34, at 4-5, 7 (Table 1). During the military
regime, public employment also declined as a percentage of the workforce. In 1970 public
employees were 9.3% of all workers; in 1973, 12.8%; and in 1978, 8.9%. Id. at 3. The decline
in public employment reflected a general reduction in the percentage of GNP expended in
the public sector. In 1970, the percentage was 22.7; by 1973, over 30; and by 1976, 17.6. Id.
42. Huneeus, supra note 1, at 117.
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Likewise, regional and provincial superintendents were all military
officers, as were the majority of governors. 43 One commentator concluded that the extensive role of the military in government gave
Pinochet, as Commander in Chief of the army, "direct power and
authority over civilian and military personnel in the governing coalition."" Thus, under the military government, the president enjoyed a control of public employment not enjoyed by his democratic predecessors.
The 1980 Constitution, approved by plebiscite, solidified the
structure of government and symbolized the return to many of the
formalities previously imposed by public employment law. Still,
the 1980 Constitution did not significantly diminish the existing
control of the military government over the public service and in
fact legitimated the previous actions of the regime.
The 1980 Constitution called for a plebiscite, conducted in October 1988, in which the public was permitted to vote "yes" or
"no" on an additional eight-year presidential term for Augusto Pinochet.45 For a variety of reasons, political support for the regime
had waned and, in what observers found a fairly conducted plebiscite, 54.7 percent of the voters rejected an additional term for Pinochet. 6 As a result of the plebiscite, freely contested elections for
President and Congress were required. In those elections, conducted in December 1989, Patricio Aylwin, representing a coalition
of opposition parties, was elected President of Chile.' 7 Aylwin's
term, deemed a transitional one, was limited to a period of four
years.'8 Thus began the formal transition to democracy in Chile.
After the electoral defeat of General Pinochet, the military
government acted to ensure continued influence or control over a
number of institutions, including the public service. Persons ap43. Id. at 116-17.
44. Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
45. For a description of the 1988 Presidential Plebiscite, see CHILE's TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1.
46. Id. at 2. Although the election itself was fairly conducted, the government-controlled media gave the government a tremendous advantage in campaigning. The opposition
was allotted a small amount of air-time compared to the resources available to the
government.
47. With Aylwin, Buchi, and Errfzuriz receiving 97% of the vote, Aylwin had received
55.2% of the vote, Buchi had received 29.4%, and Errfzuriz had received 15.14%. Shirley
Christian, Ex-Senator Defeats Two Opponents in Election to Succeed Pinochet, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at 1.
48. CHILE CONST. transitory art. 29 (added by Law No. 18.825, supra note 7, which also
contains amendments in art. 53).
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pointed as public employees during the Pinochet regime were
granted legal protections. "9 For example, a new law was enacted
allowing individuals, including public employees, to challenge actions by government officials, hereby, for the first time, granting
them access to the courts to challenge removals from office. 50 This
provision of judicial remedy perhaps reflected not so much a solicitousness for the rights of public employees, a concern belied by the
previous conduct of the military regime, as a desire to protect supporters within the bureaucracy and to confront the transitional
government with a public service composed mostly of unsympathetic, if not hostile members.
The previous discussion of the types of administrative review
available to public employees suggests the limitations on personnel
actions imposed upon the new government. The newly created judicial remedy reinforces these limitations. The Court may award
damages and in some circumstances can direct the reinstatement
of the employee."
The first cases involving public employees suggest that the
provision is an important additional protection. In one case, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitution protected public
employees by granting them property rights in their positions and
by limiting the grounds for their removal. 2 The Supreme Court's
decision and other interpretations of the rights of public employees
limit the ability of political officials to remove employees and
demonstrate the importance of providing judicial redress for violations of these rights.
The transitional government did enjoy a marginally greater
ability to make political appointments than had previous democratic governments. Changes in the law permitted the President to
make political appointments at the first three levels within a department rather than the two levels previously permitted. 53 This
49. CHILE CONST. art. 20.
50. Article 38 specifically provides a right of action to public employees. Id. art. 38.
51. Id.
52. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1989 (Eduardo M6ndez Cofe v. Mayor of the City of San
Nicoliis), Corte Suprema (Chile)(on file with author). See also Judgment of May 25, 1990
(Manuel Tapias-Rojas v. Director General of Sports and Recreation), Ct. App. Santiago
(Chile)(on file with author); Judgment of Dec. 11, 1989 (Eduardo Gonzilez Rivas v. Mayor
of the City of Talagante), Corte Suprema (Chile)(on file with author).
53. Law No. 19.972, Modifica Ley No. 18.575, OrganicaConstitucional de Bases Generates de la Administraci6n del Estado y la Ley No. 18.834 Estatuto Administrativo, 33.617
DIARIO OFICIAL Mar. 10, 1990, at 2083 (modifying Law No. 18.575, Organic Constitutional
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change allowed somewhat greater flexibility but was perceived as
more of a technical change to accommodate the administrative
structure of agencies than as a political one. The practical benefits
for the new government were limited and its choices dramatically
more restrained than those permitted by the powers exercised in
the early years of the military regime.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE

The legal regulation of public employment in Chile presents
interesting but conflicting models for evaluation of the transition.
The Chilean experience also suggests the value of specific case
studies, particularly in law, that allow generalizations about the
role of law in transitions to democratic government and offer insight for debates now occurring in the United States. The historical link between the ContraloriaGeneral de la Repablica and the
Comptroller General of the United States permits an examination
of the separate development of the two institutions. A variety of
factors have influenced the separate development of the two institutions but, again, this comparison highlights the importance of
the legal context, this time to institutional development. Finally,
the Chilean experience reminds us of both the limits and the
promises of comparative studies.
A.

Conflicting Perspectives of Public Employment Law

The lessons to be drawn from the transition in Chile regarding
legal regulation of public employment depend, in part, on the perspective from which one approaches the public employment
problems confronting the Chilean transition. Because the transition in Chile involves the restoration of long-standing democratic
traditions, it is possible to perceive the task of the Chilean transition as similar to, although greater in scope and magnitude than,
that confronting the change of administration in a liberal democratic state. Most of the forms of public employment from Chile's
democratic history are intact, as well as the principal institutions
regulating public employment. The present Administrative Statute
reflects the same view of public employees as neutral implementors
of policy that prevailed prior to the coup. For example, the restricLaw on the General Bases of the Administration of the State, and Law No. 18.834, the 1990
Administrative Statute, supra note 27).
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tions on the political activities of public employees and the guarantees of their political rights incorporate standards that existed
prior to the coup.54 The principal opinions of the ContraloriaGeneral regarding the political activities of public employees and discipline of employees from both before and after the military regime
are theoretically indistinguishable.5 5 Generally, public employees
are prohibited from engaging in political activities while on duty,
from allowing political consideration to interfere with the impartial
administration of the law, from using their authority to coerce political acts from other public employees, and from using public assets or benefits to support political activities.56 Indeed, as discussed above, the protections provided to public employees are
more significant now than before the coup.
From this perspective, the transition confronts the problem of
a new government taking over a public service that has been administrated for a considerable time by the opposing party. The
public service is likely to contain many persons who are unsympathetic or hostile to the new government. In these circumstances,
the new administration confronts the difficult choice between adhering to the protections provided to public employees or filling
the public service with sympathizers, even if this requires evasion
or violation of existing procedures. Democratic regimes can take
either course, although faithfulness to the law usually requires the
new government to be bound by the existing legal restraints, unless
altered.5 7 Therefore, the importance the transition government attaches to legal norms as limitations on the power of antidemocratic
groups counsels restraint.
The transition could draw more readily from governmental
transitions in liberal states. Likewise, the lessons to be drawn re54. See generally Contraloria General de la Repfblica, Derechos Politicas de los Funcionarios Publicosy PrescindenciaPolitica en la Administracion Publica [Political Rights
of Public Employees and Political Party Abstraction in Public Administration], 97 JUDICUL
GAZETTE,

July 21, 1988, at 113.

55. Compare Contraloria General Official Notes: Political Rights of Public Employees,
CGO numbers 85.320/64, 12.822/65, 3.509/71 with CGO numbers 24.776/87, 30.584/87,
17.404/88, 24.350/88, 26.889/89 (copies on file with author).
56. Contraloria General de la Repf1blica, supra note 54.
57. In the U.S., for example, many of the Watergate abuses surrounded attempts of the
Nixon administration to gain control of the civil service, which it perceived as partisan and
unresponsive to elected officials. In so doing, it violated a number of civil service laws and
rules. See generally Watergate and Related Activities, Use of Incumbency-Responsiveness
Program: Hearings on S. Res 60 Before the Senate Select Committee on PresidentialCampaign Activities, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

garding legal regulation of public employment in transition governments are likely to be of limited application and usefulness for
many governments now in transition.
The perspective above fails to capture the brutality of the previous regime or its strong antidemocratic philosophy. Although the
military government initially stated that its goal was to reaffirm
democratic government, its actions, and soon its rhetoric, were
much different.5 8 The military government, particularly its leader,
General Pinochet, denounced democratic government and its politicians. It touted a new vision of government in which consultation
replaced election, and in which the weakness of tolerance was replaced by the strength of the exclusion of undesirable elements
from political life. 9
From this perspective, the transition government confronts
the same problems faced by a government taking over a public service that has been constructed in a one-party state. In such a system, loyalty to the coalition in power was a necessary condition to
appointment and retention, and the bureaucracy does not hold,
but, indeed, rejects democratic values and rules. Moreover, the
constitution under which the transition government must function
contains within it a number of provisions that are inconsistent
with Chile's democratic traditions.0 0 The return of antidemocratic
forces is not foreclosed and the transition government must attempt to convert as well as control the public employees it has
inherited.
Viewed from this angle, the transition has fewer models, particularly legal ones, upon which to draw. Its task is therefore much
more difficult. On the other hand, the lessons to be drawn from the
transition are perhaps more readily applicable in other situations,
particularly in Eastern Europe. Crucial is the inculcation in the
existing bureaucracy of the importance of fidelity to law. In a bureaucracy in which actions whether by or against public employees
were not significantly restrained by law, the task requires an articulation and adherence to rules. Paradoxically, it may also require
58. The pre-coup arrangements were called "formal democracy" and the 1980 Constitution was called part of a transition to an "authoritarian and protected" democracy. OAS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 13 para. 23, at 15 para. 30 (1985).
59. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY, supra note 2.
60. Examples include the concentration of power at the presidential level, limitations
on individual rights, prohibitions on political party activity, and the role of the National
Security Council. OAS REPORT, supra note 2, 18-21 paras. 46-62; see generally AMERICAS
WATCH, supra note 9, at 36-49.
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emphasizing individual judgment and responsibility.
Adherence to rules is required in order to emphasize the restraints on the exercise of power that are basic in a democratic
system in which competing values and views are recognized. The
temptation in any bureaucracy, but particularly in one that has
served a one-party state, is to equate compliance with the orders of
superiors with compliance with the law. If so, law fails to restrain
but rather facilitates the implementation of limited and restricted
visions. Therefore, some sense of the law as separate from the will
of superiors is required.
The choice for the transition government, then, is not an easy
one. The transition government can benefit from these attitudes of
obedience. However, in emphasizing individual judgment regarding
fidelity to law, it risks authorizing opposition and obfuscation
within the bureaucracy. Still, even if the transition possesses the
power to compel obedience, in so doing it is likely to teach the
lessons taught by its predecessor and in the long run may secure
the enmity rather than the support of public employees.
Chilean public employment law contains a provision that illustrates these problems and opportunities. Although the Constitution imposes a duty to obey the orders of superiors,6" it also provides a mechanism permitting employees to challenge the legality
of such an order.2 An employee must state his or her objection in
writing. If the superior then reaffirms the order in writing, the employee is required to obey but is released from any personal responsibility for the implementation of the order.6 3 One Chilean legal scholar has argued that an employee should never be compelled
to commit a crime and that he or she would be protected from
discipline for refusal of such an order' even if the procedures of the
law are applied.6 4 Moreover, if the instruments of the state are
61. CHILE CONST. art. 55(f).
62. Id. art. 56.
63. Id. Both the employee that has asserted the order's illegality and the superior that
has reiterated it shall send copies of the communications to the appropriate agency headquarters within five days from the date of the last communication between the employee
and superior. The employee, however, has no specific right to compel decision regarding
legality by any official higher in the agency. If an employee was disciplined for refusal to
follow an order, the discipline would be reviewed by the ContraloriaGeneral as it would
review other disciplinary actions. See supra note 39. The ContraloriaGeneral would accept
as a defense to disobedience that the order required the commission of a crime. Id. The
employee would also have the right to present a claim to the courts. Id.
64. Interview with Professor Eduardo Soto Kloss, Director of the Department of Public
Law at the University of Chile (June 27, 1990) (interview notes in the author's files).
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subject to the Constitution, an order compelling the commission of
a crime does not comport with the Constitution and, therefore,
does not provide a basis for discipline. 5
The provision regarding illegal orders seems to have been
rarely used, partly due to the realities of bureaucratic life discouraging dissent and partly because of the constrained view of law in
Chile."' The transition government could use this provision as an
illustration of the differences between the attitudes of a bureaucracy in an authoritarian state and of one in a democracy. To do so
would require placing greater importance on the individual judgments of employees by protecting an employee who appropriately
refuses an order that violates the law even if the order has been
affirmed in writing. Such a position is possible within the structure
of the existing provisions and is consistent with some interpretations of the provision.
Of course, neither of these perspectives fully captures the
character of legal regulation of public employment in Chile. The
view of the transition in light of the historical links to Chilean democracy does not capture the character of the change in 1973. This
view also fails to consider the philosophy of the military government, a government that not only violated but also rejected the
rules of the game in public employment law, rules that rested upon
democratic practice and theory. Likewise, the view of the transition as the movement from a one-party state fails to recognize the
many links with Chile's democratic traditions. It also fails to consider that room for political action remained as did, therefore, the
possibility for change and modification in the regime. 7 The regime
65. Id. This position is similar to one taken in the cases in the United States that have
considered the issue. See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Public Employees and the Right to
Disobey, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 261 (1977). 'See also Ferrone v. Department of Labor, 797 F.2d
962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that employee who violated an illegal order is protected from
disciplinary action); Bigelow v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 750 F.2d 962 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (similar position); Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(noting that public employees are not compelled to obey orders that would violate the constitutional rights of third parties).
66. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
67. Manuel Garreton describes the forces and events that created space for political
action. Garreton, supra note 3.
The Pinochet government closed Parliament and prohibited party activity but
did not organize a mass party; it prohibited large trade union federations but
permitted trade unionism; it intervened in the universities but did not synchronize their faculty and students with an official ideology and apparatus of party
control; and it permitted large institutional spaces for the Catholic Church, including lay organizations. . . . The complexity and long democratic tradition of
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never effectively implemented a uniform political view applied to
all organizations and elements in society. Particularly in public
employment law, the military regime sought to emphasize the continuity in the law and the links to institutions that existed in previous democratic governments.
The lessons to be drawn from the Chilean transition rest not
simply on the concrete facts of the transition but on the perspectives from which those facts are interpreted. Different views of
public employment law present the problems and responses of the
-transition differently. In drawing lessons for transitions elsewhere,
the subjectivity of analysis remains, perhaps, the greatest lesson to
be drawn; this lesson should counsel both caution and humility.
B. The Importance of Law in the Regulation of Public
Employment
Just as perspective plays an important part in the lessons to
be drawn from Chilean transition, so perspective guides the lessons
to be drawn from case studies of the role of legal regulation. The
examination of the transition in Chile by considering legal regulation of public employment offers some perspective of the role and
of the importance of public employment.
1. The Role of Law
Many studies of transitions draw on economic or political perspectives.68 Quite appropriately, law is seen as a codification of decisions reached on other grounds or as a factor conferring legitimacy on political and social institutions arranged, in particular
forms, for other reasons. These studies, however, are sophisticated
and recognize that law is one of many factors affecting outcomes, 9
but the perspectives chosen place the role of law in the background
a country such as Chile did not permit a total synchronization.
Huneeus, supra note 1, at 124.
68. E.g., Huneeus, supra note 1 (comparing political and economic factors); DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN SPAIN: SPANISH POLITICS AFTER FRANCO (David S. Bell ed., 1983) (essays
principally concerning social and political developments); Garreton, supra note 3 (essays

focusing on political and social factors);

ROBERT GRAHAM, SPAIN:

A

NATION COMES OF AGE

(1984) (focusing on the political process leading to change); LINZ, supra note 5 (stressing
socioeconomic variables).
69. E.g., Pierre Subra De Bieusses, ConstitutionalNorms and Central Administration:
Reflections on Some of the Articles of the 29 December 1978 Constitution, in DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS IN SPAIN: SPANISH POLITICS AFTER FRANCO (David : Bell ed., 1983).
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rather than in the foreground of analysis. Certainly legal writers as
well are not parochial, but understand that social, economic, and
political factors are crucial to understanding the operation of the
law in a particular setting. A perspective based on the role of law,
however, is more likely to remember that the law does not simply
codify decisions made and reached for other reasons but also influences the outcome of a particular situation.
This difference in perspective can be illustrated by looking
again, briefly, at the role of law in the transition to democracy in
Chile. This Article has already described how a formalistic view of
legal instilaw contributed to the inability of the courts and other
70
tutions to respond significantly to the military coup.
The complexity of the situation, however, cautions, legal real71
ists in particular, against too hasty an indictment of formalism.
The first of these cautionary signs is the visible, if not central, role
that human rights lawyers played in the opposition to the military
regime.7 2 The second arises from the continuity and viability of legal institutions in Chile. Indeed, the survival of these institutions
is one of the reasons that it is possible to treat the transition under
70. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25. Ironically, the Chilean civil law tradition
rests heavily on the French Civil Code. In the context of the French Revolution, the formalism of the law and restrictions on judges sought to protect democratic development from an
unpopular judiciary closely connected with the ancient regime. MERRYMAN & CLARK, supra
note 16, at 183-85 (citing JOHN PHILIPPE DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 369-71 (1968)).
In a different context these principles limiting the judiciary helped to undermine democratic
government by removing the courts as a significant restraint on abuse of the law.
71. Suspending judgment is particularly difficult for attorneys trained in the United
States where legal realism dominates legal education. The difference in perspective between
U.S. law students and many Chilean scholars was exemplified by an exchange between U.S.
students and a Chilean constitutional law scholar on the issue of whether the Chilean Supreme Court could declare a statute unconstitutional.
The professor noted that although the Supreme Court could find that the application of
a statute in a particular case violated constitutional norms, it could not declare.the statute
unconstitutional because the decision was applicable in only one case and not binding on
the courts as precedent. Students immediately argued that regardless of the rule limiting
application of the decision, it would likely have an effect similar to precedent.
One student asserted that attorneys have an incentive to examine the case to advise
clients acting in similar circumstances; in fact another student believed it would be unprofessional not to do so. Still another student, noting the hierarchical structure of the court
system and the personnel authority of the Supreme Court over lower court judges, argued
that lower court judges were likely to be guided by the Supreme Court's decision without
regard to the formal rules of precedent. The Chilean scholar seemed puzzled, and somewhat
amused, by these responses, particularly when the rule limiting the impact of the decision
was so clear. Conversation held at the University of Chile School of Law during the Washington College of Law's Law Program in Chile (1990).
72. See generally Fruhling, supra note 4.
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73
the model of a change of governments in a democratic system.

Chile offers, in contrast to the popular perception of lawyers in
the United States, the ideal of the lawyer as political hero or heroine. For a substantial period of time the only space for the opposition in Chile, particularly during the years immediately following
the coup, was that formed by the activities of attorneys.7" These
lawyers prepared cases for presentation to the courts, interviewed
and represented clienfs, and, at some personal risk, asserted the
accountability of the government for its actions.76
These activities by lawyers contributed greatly to the organization of groups victimized by the repression, 7' and the documentation of the abuses by the military regime. This documentation
played an important role both internally and externally, where officials of governmental and nongovernmental organizations in a variety of countries responded to the abuses.7 8 The selection of this
strategy suggests that, despite their unresponsiveness, the courts
73. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
74. To some, the activities of these lawyers illustrates as much the power of the Catholic Church that shielded them as the importance of attorneys in the opposition. Huneeus,
supra note 1, at 124. Still, of the strategies possible, one based on legal action was chosen.
75. Human rights advocates did face considerable personal risk.
But human rights monitors have not gone unpunished for their attempts to publicize abuses. By 1976, the Vicariate was under attack, its lawyers arrested, detaJined, exiled. Since then, pressure on human rights monitors has varied but
never ended altogether. In 1980, the archbishop of Santiago was threatened with
death. And both 1981 and 1982 showed an increasing incidence of harassment.
In 1981 [the president of a human rights group] was expelled, and eight human
rights monitors arrested-on Human Rights Day-on charges of political activity. In 1982, there were threats against Church lawyers by a secret squad calling
itself Catacumbas ('Catacombs'); members of virtually all the existing human
rights groups were arrested, tortured, threatened and/or sent into internal exile,
and the offices of one organization, CODEPU (The Committee for People's
Rights), were burned down.
AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE SINCE THE Coup: TEN YEARS OF REPRESSION 40 (1983).
76. Fruhling, supra note 4, at 371.
[L]egal aid became a source of moral support to people persecuted, and created
common bonds among lawyers who had held contradictory political views in previous years. To this extent, human rights advocacy played a role in the revival of
political dissent, forging a common ground from which it was possible to criticize
the regime.
Id. at 371-72. These contacts may have begun the return to trust and cooperation that permitted the coordination leading to the electoral victories of 1988 and 1989.
77. Id. at 365, 369 (discussing the importance of the dissemination of information regarding human rights abuses). The lawyers continued to function even when the military
regime modified the laws to eliminate previous constitutional defenses. Garreton, supra note
3, at 105 (noting changes to eliminate constitutional defenses).
78. See generally the sources cited in supra note 2.
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remained a viable focus of activity. Perhaps the formalism of the
law explains why it remained an option for attorneys and why such
recourse was tolerated by the military. The narrow conception of
the law permitted challenges to the regime that could neither have
been made nor tolerated in a forum where the political character of
the challenges was more openly acknowledged or their success
79
more likely anticipated.
The second cautionary sign is the number of important legal
institutions that survived the military regime. Among these institutions were the courts and the Contraloria General. These institutions survived in more than name alone. The courts retained the
same theory or philosophy of law and the same structure as before
the coup. 0 Likewise, the ContraloriaGeneral remained intact and,
as an examination of its opinions indicates, its interpretations of
public employment law looked much the same in 1988 as in 1971.81'
Of course, these events may only attest to the impotency of
the courts and the irrelevancy of the law to much of what occurred
during the regime. Still, the survival of legal institutions and the
maintenance of a consistent jurisprudence were not small accomplishments during eighteen years of dictatorship. It provided the
transition government with a framework making it possible to
claim legal rules as restraints on power, a claim of great importance and significant practical value.
The events in Chile suggest that a society's view of the importance of the legal rules and the scope of judicial discretion can significantly influence the choices available to a transition government. A North American can also detect in the events in Chile
implications for the debate in the United States regarding the role
of the judiciary.
If we can detect these implications, the Chilean experience offers some warning to the more extreme advocates of judicial restraint. Likewise, it warns those who see the courts of necessity
involved in discretionary choices implicating politics, economics,
and philosophy and who advocate the abandonment of formal doc79. One reason for the strategy of -human rights lawyers despite the conservatism of the
courts was the belief of the lawyers "that the judiciary was the last institutional remnant of
the liberal-democratic state." Fruhling, supra note 4, at 359.
80. The courts, but particularly the Supreme Court, remain very conservative. Under
the constitutional provisions now in effect, new courts, such as the reformed Constitutional
Tribunal, play a greater role than before the coup.
81. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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trine that obscures the true character of the decisions to be made.
As noted above, legal realists should be concerned that too expansive a view of legal discretion risks undermining the divisions
that permit protection of legal institutions. The narrow rule-based
formalism of the civil code gave a primacy to the legislature, a primacy now used effectively by advocates of a limited judicial role.
The Chilean experience shows that formalism, because of its modest perception of the scope of legal questions, possesses some important strengths. While the scope of the law is diminished, this
diminution, ironically, protects the institutions designed to apply
these rules and within its scope may give the law greater influence.
The advocates of judicial restraint should be concerned about
the inability of the Chilean judicial system to make rights meaningful in a time of crisis. As the activities of the military regime
demonstrated, the perception of law as a formally applied set of
codified rules limited the ability of the law and legal institutions to
respond to abuses. Clearly, perceptions about the role of judges influenced the attitudes and behavior of Chilean jurists and encouraged accommodation with the military regime. Moreover, the
constrained role of the legal system abdicated many important
functions of law and, by hiding the choices that judges made, convinced judges they were making no meaningful political or social
decisions-that they were "slaves of the law." Judicial restraint
then justified' abdication and prevented self-examination as cant
replaced analysis and slogan replaced introspection.
2. Regulation of Public Employment
Public employment law offers a unique perspective of the
problems and challenges confronting a transitional regime. This
perspective relies on viewing the regulation of public employment
as a legal problem, the solution of which is particularly efficacious
in exposing the legal context in which a transition government
must operate.
Public employment and public employees viewed from an economic or political perspective seem often to have already been considered as part of the political, social, and economic forces that led
to transition.2 For those reasons, public employees can be ex82. There are, of course exceptions. For example, Robert Graham discusses the role of
the civil service in a transition and the techniques used to control it by the transition gov-
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pected to follow the policies of the transition government. Public
employees can also be easily conceived as instruments of the particular government in power. While they have their own political
and economic interests, they can be expected to follow the directives of that government. Visions of public employment in both
one-party and liberal states often share, for differing reasons, the
view that public employees are to implement the will of the government rather than their own particular interests.
In a one-party state, this view of public employees follows
from the preeminent role of the party and its responsibility to direct the administration of the state."3 In a liberal state, this vision
of public employment also is intended to assure party control and
substitutes for a more complete theory of accountability of the
bureaucracy."'
Of course, a considerable amount of analysis focuses on the
interests of public employees and on how their economic and political views shape governmental policy. 5 By implication, it shows
how they could seriously impede a transition government whose
goals conflict with the interests of significant groups in the bureaucracy. This perspective would suggest much greater attention to
the techniques of control of public employees by a transition government, with some emphasis on legal regulation, than has generally been given by much of the transition literature. From this perspective, public employment law becomes a tool or device to deal
with administrative and practical details.
Chilean public employment law continues to reflect the perspective regarding legal control that could be expected in a liberal,
multiparty state. Several provisions, such as the protection of the
GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 258-60.
83. See generally A. DOAK BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY,

ernment.
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(1967).

84. The principal differences in the vision in a multiparty state and a one-party state
concern the principle of political neutrality. In a one-party state, such neutrality would be
disfavored or prohibited. In a multiparty state, the needs regarding the transition of power
require neutrality. Neutrality, and the protections for civil servants from the government in
power that it implies, creates a special need for a theory of accountability because the authority of the democratically elected government is limited in controlling the civil service. In
the United States, the dominant theory deemphasized the policy-making functions of public
employees.
85. For examples of literature addressing the importance of the economic and political
interests of the bureaucracy, see CLEAVES, supra note 33 (focusing on development); PETRAS,

supra note 29, at 288-317 (also focusing on development); and THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM
IN LATIN AMERICA (David Collier ed., 1979) (discussing the breakdown of democracy).
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tenure of public employees and the requirement of political neutrality, implement a view that public employees are to be neutral
in the performance of their duties.8 Protection of their positions
provides a ground for principled action and assures that decisions
affecting their careers will rest upon the performance of their duties. 7 As protection prevents coercion, requirements of political
neutrality prevent abuse of their positions. These aspects of public
employment law reflect a general view of public employees as neutral implementors of policy.
The provisions designed to insure that public employees have
a method of raising concerns about the illegality of orders, in fact,
act to guarantee compliance with the orders of superiors and stress
the importance of chain of command within the hierarchy. 8 Unitary command has fitted well, in the United States, with the theory
that public employees are politically neutral servants of the government in power.8 9
Although the United States and Chile differ significantly regarding the role of law and of the courts, the perceptions of public
employment contained in the two legal systems bear some striking
similarities. These similarities suggest that the transition has a variety of legal controls on which to draw. These similarities also suggest some additional caution in applying the Chilean experience to
legal regulation of public employment required by other transition
governments, as in Eastern Europe.9 0
The similarities of views in Chile and in the United States regarding public employment also present issues for the debate regarding public employment in the United States. Increasingly,
public employment law in the United States has given elected officials greater control over public service by increasing the number
of political appointees,9 1 by easing the protections against removals
86. Supra text accompanying notes 26-39.
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65; but see text accompanying note 66 (noting how infrequently these provisions are utilized).
89. See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public
Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417 (1990).
90. Legal control arises more readily in a multiparty state. Therefore, the problems of
control and the role of legal regulation are-likely to be different in the transition from a oneparty state.
91. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the use of a patronage system in making
promotion and transfer decisions regarding lower-level government employees violated those
employees' First Amendment right of freedom of speech and association.
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of public employees,9 2 and by creating incentives for high level civil
servants to follow the directions of political appointees.9 3 The rationale for these developments has been greater political accountability of the bureaucracy to officials elected democratically. The
Chilean experience suggests that such experiments may be inconsistent with some basic premises of neutrality and indicates the
importance of legal control of public employment in a democratic
society.
The experience in Chile offers lessons for other transitions; it
also offers some lessons for us. The comparisons and contrasts enable us to examine our own system from a new perspective. Just as
a study of public employment law in Chile's transition emphasizes
the importance of law, it also suggests a more central role to be
accorded to public employment in studies of transition.
C.

Institutional Parallelsand Divergences

One method of examining the similarities and differences in
regulation of public employment requires an exploration of the
substance and content of public employment law as suggested
above. Another method explores institutional frameworks of regulation. A comparison of the development of the Contralora General de la Repablica with that of the Comptroller General of the
United States provides an opportunity for such an exploration.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 19211" created the Comptroller General of United States and the General Accounting Office
that the Comptroller General heads. The Act created an independent office with wide powers of audit and control over governmental expenditures, investigative authority, and with some limited judicial responsibilities." The Comptroller General embodied a long
tradition in both British and American government; the Budget
and Accounting Act reminded contemporary observers of
landmark British legislation.9
92. See 5 U.S.C. ch. 43 (1982). The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 eased the burden
on managers who remove employees for unsatisfactory performance. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.

§§ 4302-4303 (1980).
93. 5 U.S.C. ch. 33 (1982). This chapter of the Reform Act provides flexibility in the
selection of high level executive officials, as well as more flexibility in assignment and pay.
94. 42 Stat. 20 (June 10, 1921) (codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-779 (1982)).
95. Id. §§ 711-720.
96. WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, THE LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 17 (1927) (noting a "close analogy to the
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The Comptroller General exercised indirect authority over
government employees through review of government expenditures
and through opinions regarding the legality of employment practices related to the fiscal matters. 7 The Civil Service Commission,
created in 1883, exercised much broader authority over the personnel practices of federal agencies.9 8
The first Comptroller General, J. Raymond McCarl, emphasized detailed examination of governmental expenditures. The
General Accounting Office examined literally millions of individual
transactions with a meticulousness decried by critics of the office. 9
This view of the function of the office created the setting in which
its operating rules, procedures, and forms were developed.
The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act also demonstrated congressional concern about executive control of the existing comptroller functions and its desire to create mechanisms to strengthen
legislative control over appropriations. 10 0 The legislative orientation of the Comptroller General and of the General Accounting Office has played an important role in its subsequent development.
The creation of the ContraloriaGeneral de la Rep6blica coincided with a period of intense legislative-executive conflict in
Chile. 0 1 The Contraloria General, although granted considerable
independence, did not acquire the same legislative orientation as
the Comptroller General of the United States.
famous Exchequer and Audit Department Act, 1866, of Great Britain").
97. For a discussion of the history of this role of the Comptroller General, see

JOSEPH

PoIs, WATCHDOG ON THE POTOMAC: A STUDY OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES

chs. 2, 7 (1979).

98. A discussion of the history of the United States Civil Service Commission can be
found in VAUGHN, supra note 32, ch. 1.
99. GEORGE CHARLES SUMNER BENSON, FINANCIAL CONTROL AND INTEGRATION: A STUDY
IN ADMINISTRATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES ch. III (1934) (criticism of the practices of the Comptroller General); HARVEY CLAFLIN MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: A STUDY IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF FINAN-

CIAL ADMINISTRATION 2-5 (1939) (outlining criticisms of the Budget and Accounting Act
based on McCarl's tenure); FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF Two AGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET 48-56 (1984) (describing criticisms of McCarl's tenure).
100. MOSHER, supra note 99, ch. 1.

101. Between 1924 and December 1932, a junta dismissed the parliament, a constitutional revision established a new parliament, a coup replaced the parliament; the President
driven from power in 1924 returned and Parliament was again restructured similar to its
organization in 1924. Bernadino Bravo, Chile 1925-1932: De la Nueva Constitucibn al
Nuevo Regimen del Gobierno, inLA CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPOBLICA: 50 ARos DE
VIDA INSTITUCIONAL

1927-1977, at 29-42 (1977).
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The Chilean Congress drew on both the British and the U.S.
experience in creating the Contraloria General. A presidential
commission, studying the creation of the office, sought to rely on a
plan prepared for the commission by Professor Walter Kemmerer
of Princeton University.0 2 The commission, however, had difficulty
in obtaining a Spanish translation of Kemmerer's text and instead
relied on the North American models contained in the Report of
the Committee on Economy and Efficiency established by President Taft prior to the creation of the Comptroller General of the
10 3
United States.
After the commission's report, the Chilean Congress enacted
legislation creating the Contraloria General de la Repablica and
articulating its powers.104 These powers followed those held by the
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of England. 10 5 Also,
the legislation created the project on the Office of the Contraloria
General, a project empowered to establish procedures and rules for
the office.' 0 6 On March 25, 1927, one day before the enactment of
the legislation creating the office of the ContraloriaGeneral de la
Repablica and the project, the Chilean government asked the U.S.
for a set of "rules, forms, proceedings of labor and other such
things as are related to the General Accounting and Comptroller
General of the United States."'' 0
The exigencies of its creation influenced the development of
the Contraloria General. The English model, although sharing
much with the North American one, failed to provide the investigative authority of the Comptroller General or to articulate the
legislative-executive conflict inherent in the Budget and Accounting Act. 0 8 Also, the forms and procedures of the U.S. Comptroller
General incorporated the view of the first Comptroller General,
emphasizing formal compliance and detailed examination of individual records. 0 9
In the United States, the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office moved first from detailed examination of in102. Hector Humeres Magnan, Creationof the ContraloriaGeneral de la Repablica, in
supra note 35, at 5 (1977).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id.
108. See MOSHER, supra note 99, ch. 1.
109. Id.
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dividual transactions to the analysis of accounting and control systems within the agencies. 110 The first evolution contributed to a
second in which the General Accounting Office emphasized its
analysis and examination of policies and programs as well as accounting and fiscal control."'
Although the Civil Service Commission exercised review of a
variety of agency personnel actions, the Comptroller General influenced policy through fiscal rules and directives and more recently
through reports and program analyses. 2 By 1973, the Comptroller
General and the General Accounting Office had emerged as an investigative and policy agency identified with legislative interests."'
The Contraloria General remained much more a review
agency concerned with formal compliance. Its review of personnel
actions reflected this perspective; it did not examine the merits of
actions but focused on compliance with formal procedures." 4 The
Contraloria General, an office which enjoyed protected tenure," 5
remained an influential and prestigious office. Through formal review, it supported the rule of law, a function closely tied to the
view of law in the Chilean legal system.
The ContraloriaGeneral also lacked the legislative orientation
of the Comptroller General. The legislation establishing the Contraloria General did not create an agency analogous to the Office
of Management and Budget. Therefore, the Contraloria General
lacked the institutional framework inclining the Comptroller General of the United States to a legislative role."'
By 1973, the ContraloriaGeneral was established as an important and powerful office in the Chilean government. For a variety
of reasons, including those discussed above, the character of the
function of the ContraloriaGeneral had diverged from that .of the
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 5-12, and chs. 2, 3 & 5.
Id.
See generally Pois, supra note 97.
See generally RICHARD E. BROWN, THE GAO: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER, 57-97 (1979); MOSHER, supra note 99, ch. 5; Pols, supra note 97, ch. 2.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
115. The 1980 Constitution as amended reproduces a provision from earlier constitutions regarding the tenure of the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General of Chile is
appointed by the President with the approval of a majority of the Senate. The appointment
is until the age of 75 at which time the Comptroller General must leave office. Otherwise,
the Comptroller General is not removable. CHILE CONST. art. 87.
116. GIL, supra note 38, at 97-98 (noting the uniqueness, independence and executive
authority of the Contraloria General de la RepCiblica).

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

Comptroller General. Two aspects of this divergence-the emphasis on formal review and the greater executive orientation of the
office-played important roles in the operation of the Contraloria
General during the military regime.
The military government exempted the Contraloria General,
as well as the courts, from the decree directing that all public employees serve at the pleasure of the President.11 7 As noted earlier,
the ContraloriaGeneral, consistent with the formalism of Chilean
legal culture, functioned within the military regime without repudiating its duties and responsibilities in the regulation of public
employment." 8
The military, soon after the coup, began a series of administrative reforms that ostensibly decentralized power at the local
level by removing these levels from some administrative controls,
including ones by the Contraloria General, previously applicable
to them."19 In practice, these reforms tended to centralize power
because regional officials, such as superintendents, mayors and
governors, were directly appointed by and responsible to President
Pinochet and the military junta.'20
The Contraloria General continued to exercise its remaining
review functions and retained some power based on these functions. That power, however, could be more formal than real. This
formal power as well as the practical weakness of the Contraloria
General were demonstrated by the exercise of the Contraloria
General's authority to object to executive decrees and resolutions
that would exceed the authority granted or violate the Constitution.' 2 ' In 1978, the military government held a "consultation" in
which citizens were asked to confirm by vote the government's administration in light of external criticisms of it. The government
characterized the vote as a "consultation" because the procedures
117. See OAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
118. See supra text accompanying note 40.
119. See Bravo, supra note 101, at 339-41.
120. The control over regional and local officials by General Pinochet and the junta is
described in the text accompanying notes 42-44, supra.
121. This power was a historical one of the CGR incorporated into subsequent constitutional revisions. As to those decrees subject to review by the Comptroller General, the
Comptroller General may "take reason" that a decree or resolution is illegal but shall not
interfere with its application if the President of the Republic insists on implementation
supported by the signatures of all of the president's ministers. If the Comptroller General's
objection is that the decree is contrary to the Constitution, the matter must be referred to
the Constitutional Tribunal for resolution. The decree is not enforced until its constitutionality is resolved. CHILE CONST. art. 88.
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used did not meet the constitutional requirements of a plebiscite.
The Contraloria General held that the decree establishing the
"consultation" was unconstitutional.'2 2 Within a few days, the
23
Chilean Comptroller General had been forced to resign.'
A number of historical and societal factors created the divergence in role and function between the ContraloriaGeneral de la
Rep(tblica and the Comptroller General of the United States. One
of these factors relates to the view of the law in Chilean society. In
Chile, enforcement concerns compliance with formal norms rather
than with actual results; review in a variety of legal institutions,
including the courts, rests on documentary evidence; and the role
and function of the law is strictly limited. The development of the
Contraloria General reflects this legal culture. This relationship
between the development of specific legal institutions and the legal
culture in which these institutions operate offers insight into not
only institutions in Chile but also ones in the United States. Institutional roles that comport with generally accepted views of law
are much easier to adopt and to maintain than roles that diverge
from the general legal culture. This relationship suggests that the
history of administrative institutions in the United States can
fruitfully consider these issues of legal theory, particularly the role
of legal realism.
The divergence of role and function between the Contraloria
General and Comptroller General presents in another setting the
importance of the legal context in comparative studies. The importance of the legal context demonstrates the pertinence of comparative law to the study of transitions to democracy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An examination of public employment law in the transition to
democracy in Chile reminds us that the evaluation of a transition
and the lessons to be drawn from it rest upon the analytical models chosen. In public employment law, these models present differing lessons for other governments involved in the transition to democracy. Much depends on perspective.
The Article shows that the legal context provides not simply a
122.

AMERICAS WATCH,

supra note 9, at 18 (citing

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

GROUP, REPORT ON THE CHILEAN ELECTORAL PROCESS 38 (1987)).

123. Id. at 18.
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background against which other factors play, but forms a steady
influence on the development of institutions, on the content of the
specific laws, and on the behavior of individuals. In particular, the
Chilean experience exposes the weaknesses and strengths of formalism and affirms legal theory as an important element in comparative studies.
Comparative law emerges as a crucial discipline in the study of
transitions to democracy. It emphasizes the role of law; it directs
inquiry beyond the cataloguing of specific provisions; it offers
unique insights. Comparative study also highlights the role of the
legal culture, often hidden from the observer within a particular
legal system, in the development of legal rules and institutions.

